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ABSTRACT
We estimate a structural model of optimal life-cycle housing and consumption in the
presence of realistic labor income and house price uncertainties. The model postulates
constant elasticity of substitution between housing service and nonhousing consump-
tion, and explicitly incorporates a house adjustment cost. Our estimation ¯ts the cross-
sectional and time-series household wealth and housing pro¯les from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics quite well, and suggests an intra-temporal elasticity of substitution be-
tween housing and nonhousing consumption of 0.33 and a housing adjustment cost that
amounts to about 15 percent of house value. Policy experiments with estimated prefer-
ence parameters imply that households respond nonlinearly to house price changes with
large house price declines leading to sizable decreases in both the aggregate homeown-
ership rate and aggregate non-housing consumption. The average marginal propensity
to consume out of housing wealth changes ranges from 0.4 percent to 6 percent. When
lending conditions are tightened in the form of a higher down payment requirement,
interestingly, large house price declines result in more severe drops in the aggregate
homeownership rate but milder decreases in nonhousing consumption.
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papers=.1. Introduction
The U.S. housing market has experienced dramatic price movements in recent years. These
movements, accompanied by substantial increases in household indebtedness, have drawn the
attention of policymakers and academicians. Calibrated housing models are now increas-
ingly deployed in studying the e®ects of housing on consumption and savings (Campbell and
Cocco 2007, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2005, Li and Yao 2007, Stokey 2007, Kiyotaki,
Michaelides, and Nikolov 2007), on stock market participation and asset allocation (Cocco
2005, Flavin and Yamashita 2002, and Yao and Zhang 2005), on asset pricing (Piazzesi,
Schneider, and Tuzel 2007, Siegel 2005, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 2005, Davis and Mar-
tin 2008, and Flavin and Nakagawa 2008), and on the transmission channel and e®ectiveness
of monetary policy (Iacoviello 2005).
Despite the growing interest in housing models, econometric research aiming at identifying
the relevant housing preference parameters has been lacking. As a consequence, theoretical
models are often calibrated with little empirical guidance regarding the key model input
parameters. In particular, the functional form for the felicity function and its parameterization
are typically chosen out of convenience.1
Among the few econometric studies of housing preference, there has been little consensus on
the magnitudes of these housing preference parameters. Speci¯cally, studies based on macro-
level aggregate consumption or asset price data frequently suggest a value larger than one for
the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption
| implying that economic agents reduce expenditure on housing when house prices move up
relative to prices of nonhousing consumption (Davis and Martin 2008, and Piazzesi, Schneider,
and Tuzel 2007). These studies have typically assumed the existence of a representative
agent and abstracted from market incompleteness and informational frictions, despite strong
evidence of household heterogeneity and housing adjustment cost documented in the literature
(Eberly 1994, Caballero 1993, Carroll and Dunn 1997, and Attanasio 2000).
1Many theoretical studies using numerical calibrations adopt Cobb-Douglas utility function for its simplicity
and often abstract from housing adjustment costs. These studies cite the relative constant share of aggregate
housing expenditure in the National Income and Product Account as supporting evidence of the Cobb-Douglas
preference. The Consumer Expenditure Survey, however, indicates that expenditure shares at aggregate as
well as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level have °uctuated over time with the aggregate share
increasing over the last two decades. The movements at the MSA level are mixed with many experiencing
upward movement. See Stokey (2007) and Kahn (2008) for additional evidence against Cobb-Douglas utility
speci¯cation.
2In contrast, investigations using household-level data recover much lower values for the
elasticity parameter, often in the range of 0.15 and 0.50 (See, for example, Flavin and Nak-
agawa 2008, Hanushek and Quigley 1980, Siegel 2005, and Stokey 2007.) These studies,
however, often su®er from selection bias in the sense that households endogenously make de-
cisions on both house tenure (renting vs. owning, moving vs. staying) and the quantity of
housing services °ows. As a result, these analyses cannot separate the e®ects of elasticity of
substitution from the e®ects of housing transaction costs. Furthermore, the identi¯cation in
many of the studies is predicated on households having unlimited access to credit, which con-
tradicts the practice in reality.2 The lack of robustness to market friction and incompleteness,
therefore, complicates the interpretation of the empirical estimates in these studies.3
This paper structurally estimates a stochastic life-cycle model of consumption, savings, and
housing choices, and jointly identi¯es the intra-temporal as well as inter-temporal preference
parameters by matching average wealth and housing pro¯les generated by the model with
pro¯les from micro data. We postulate constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences
over housing and nonhousing consumption and allow households to make housing decisions
along both the extensive margin of homeownership and the intensive margin of housing service
°ows and house value. The model also explicitly admits a housing transaction cost and a
collateral borrowing constraint, as well as labor income and house price uncertainties. Our
model, therefore, builds on a growing literature examining household house tenure choice and
housing consumption choices within a life-cycle framework (Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2005,
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2005, Gervais 2002, Campbell and Cocco 2007, Chambers,
Garriga, and Schlagenhauf 2007, Yao and Zhang 2005, and Li and Yao 2007).
Our estimation of the structural parameters is achieved through the method of simulated
moments (MSM). Speci¯cally, we ¯rst construct the average wealth, homeownership rates,
house value{income ratio, and rent{income ratio pro¯les from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) data set across three age groups for each calender year between 1984 and
2005. For homeownership rates, house values, and rent values, we further group households
according to the level of house price in their state of residence and compute additional mo-
ments. We then numerically solve the model for optimal household behavior and simulate the
2See Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007) for a discussion on the bias that arises in estimation of ex-post
Euler equations.
3For example, a household with a high elasticity of substitution may not wish to adjust its house and
consumption after a signi¯cant house price appreciation, since accessing appreciated housing assets will trigger
signi¯cant transaction costs.
3model to generate paths of life-cycle housing and wealth pro¯les in the same manner as the
data moments to eliminate potential bias caused by cohort and time e®ects as well as selection
bias. By minimizing the weighted di®erence between the simulated model pro¯les and their
empirical counterparts, we identify the parameters of our structural model.
Our simulated wealth and housing pro¯les o®er a good match to the data over the sample
period. Our estimation also reveals that after explicitly accounting for house adjustment
costs, the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between housing services and nondurables
is around 0.33, a value much lower than the estimates based on aggregated time series. Our
estimate of the housing transaction costs for married couples amounts to 15 percent of house
value, which is consistent with the low mobility rate in the data. Our estimated values of the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion and the time discount factor, at 6.19 and 0.96, are in line
with those provided by the previous literature.
Finally, we use our estimated model to conduct policy experiments. In particular, we
investigate how households respond to changes in house prices coupled with changes in income
and ¯nancial conditions. We ¯nd that households respond nonlinearly to changes in house
prices. Large house price depreciation leads to signi¯cant decreases in both homeownership
rate and nonhousing consumption. Simultaneous income declines exacerbate these adverse
e®ects. Interestingly, while a tighter ex ante borrowing constraint aggravates the negative
e®ect of house price declines on the homeownership rate, it alleviates the negative impact on
nonhousing consumption in a housing market downturn.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper represents one of the ¯rst structural estimations of
housing preference parameters that are consistent with both time series and cross-sectional ev-
idence on households' housing consumption and savings decisions. Estimating a rich life-cycle
model allows us to address potential biases directly, by replicating them in the simulation.
The recent paper by Bajari, Chan, Krueger, and Miller (2008) is the closest in spirit to our
paper. There are, however, important di®erences. Bajari et al. adopt a two-step approach.
In the ¯rst step, reduced form decision rules are estimated together with the law of motion for
state variables. The structural parameters are estimated in the second step using simulation
based on reduced form decision rule in the ¯rst step. In contrast, we solve the decision rules
endogenously instead of imposing reduced forms. Second, we explicitly model and estimate
households' tenure decision. Finally, we jointly estimate housing adjustment costs with the
4intratemporal elasticity parameter as there are important tradeo®s between the two parame-
ters.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a life-cycle model of
housing choices with an adjustment cost. In Section 3, we lay out our estimation strategy and
describe the data sources. Section 4 discusses our main ¯ndings and implications. We perform
policy experiments in Section 5. We conclude and point to future extensions in Section 6.
2. The Model Economy
Our modeling strategy extends that of Yao and Zhang (2005) and Li and Yao (2007) by
admitting a °exible speci¯cation of elasticity of substitution between housing and other con-
sumption.
We consider an economy where a household lives for at most T periods. The probability




¸j; 0 · t · T; (1)
where ¸j is the probability that the household is alive at time j conditional on being alive at
time j ¡ 1, j = 0;:::;T. We set ¸0 = 1, ¸T = 0, and 0 < ¸j < 1 for all 0 < j < T.
The household derives utility from consuming a numeraire good Ct and housing services
Ht, as well as from bequeathing wealth Qt. The within-period utility demonstrates a constant






























where Nt denotes the exogenously given e®ective family size, which captures the economies of
scale in household consumption. The parameter ! controls the expenditure share on housing
5services; and ³ governs the degree of intratemporal substitutability between housing and
nondurable consumption goods. We denote the bequest function as B(Qt).
In each period, the household receives income Yt. Prior to the retirement age, which is set










is the permanent labor income at time t. P Y
t has a deterministic component f(t;Zt), which
is a function of age and household characteristics Zt. ºt represents the shock to permanent
labor income. "t is the transitory shock to Yt. We assume that fln"t;lnºtg are independently
and identically normally distributed with mean f¡0:5¾2
";¡0:5¾2
ºg, and variance f¾2
";¾2
ºg, re-
spectively. Thus, lnP Y
t follows a random walk with a deterministic drift f(t;Zt).4
After retirement, the household receives a constant income which constitutes a fraction µ
(0 < µ < 1) of its pre-retirement permanent labor income,
Yt = µP
Y
J ; for t = J;:::;T: (5)
2.1. Housing and Mortgage Contracts
A household can acquire housing services through either renting or owning. A renter has
housing tenure Do
t = 0, and a homeowner has housing tenure Do
t = 1. To rent, the household
pays a fraction ® (0 < ® < 1) of the market value of the rental house. The house price
appreciation rate ~ rH
t follows an i.i.d. normal process with mean ¹H and variance ¾2
H. The
shock to house prices, P H
t , is thus permanent and exogenous.5
A household can ¯nance home purchases with a mortgage. The mortgage balance denoted
by Mt needs to satisfy the following collateral constraint at all times,
0 · Mt · (1 ¡ ±)P
H
t Ht; (6)
4The labor income process follows that of Carroll and Samwick (1997), which is also adopted in Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
5Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Campbell and Cocco (2007), and Yao and Zhang (2005) also make similar
assumptions about house price dynamics.
6where 0 · ± · 1, and P H
t Ht denotes the value of the house at time t.6 The borrowing rate r
is time-invariant and the same as lending rate. A homeowner is required to spend a fraction
Ã (0 · Ã · 1) of the house value on repair and maintenance in order to keep the housing
quality constant.
At the beginning of each period, the household receives a moving shock, Dm
t , that takes
a value of 1 if the household has to move for reasons that are exogenous to our model, and
0 otherwise. The moving shock does not a®ect a renter's housing choice since he does not
incur any moving costs. When a homeowner receives a moving shock (Dm
t = 1), he is forced
to sell his house.7 A homeowner who does not have to move for exogenous reasons can choose
to liquidate his house voluntarily. The selling decision, Ds
t, is 1 if the homeowner sells and 0
otherwise. Selling a house incurs a transaction cost that is a fraction Á (0 · Á · 1) of the
market value of the existing house. Additionally, the full mortgage balance becomes due upon
the sale of the home. Following a home sale|for either exogenous or endogenous reasons|a
homeowner faces the same decisions as a renter coming into period t, and is free to buy or
rent for the current period.
2.2. Liquid Assets
In addition to home equity, a household can also save in liquid assets which earn the same
constant risk-free rate r as the borrowing rate.8 We denote the liquid savings as St and assume
that households cannot borrow noncollateralized debt, i.e.,
St ¸ 0; for t = 0;:::;T: (7)
6By applying collateral constraints to both newly initiated mortgages and ongoing loans, we e®ectively
rule out default. Default on mortgages is, until recently, relatively rare in reality. According to the Mortgage
Bankers Association, the seasonally adjusted three-month default rate for a prime ¯xed-rate mortgage loans
was around 2 percent prior to 2007.
7We assume that house prices in the old and new locations are the same. Hence in our model households
cannot move for di®erential house prices.
8Under the assumption of costless re¯nancing, the household will never simultaneously hold both liquid
savings and a mortgage if di®erent lending and borrowing rates are allowed. When the lending and borrowing
rates are the same, there is an indeterminacy with respect to liquid saving and mortgage holdings. From the
household perspective, paying down the mortgage by $1 is equivalent to increasing his liquid savings by the
same amount as long as the collateral constraint is satis¯ed (equation (6)).
72.3. Wealth Accumulation and Budget Constraints













The last term ´P Y
t denotes government transfers. Following Hubbard et al. (1994, 1995) and
De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006), we assume that government transfers provide a wealth
°oor that is proportional to the household's permanent labor income.10 The intertemporal
budget constraint, therefore, can be written as:




































The third term on the right-hand side of the budget constraint represents housing expen-
diture by those who decide to be renters in the current period; the fourth term represents
housing expenditure by households who decide to buy houses; and the ¯fth term represents
housing expenditure of households who reside in their old houses.
2.4. The Optimization Problem
We assume that upon death, a household distributes its spendable resources Qt among L
bene¯ciaries to ¯nance their numeraire good and housing services consumption for one period,
the latter through renting. Parameter \L" thus controls the strength of bequest motives.
Under CES utility, this assumption results in the bene¯ciary's expenditure on numeraire good
and housing service consumption at a proportion that is a function of house price:
Ct




(1 ¡ !)³ + !³(®P H
t )1¡³: (10)
9Under this de¯nition, conditional on selling his house, a homeowner's problem is identical to that of a
renter with same age t, permanent income PY
t , house price per unit of housing services PH
t , and liquidated
wealth Qt.
10In our simulation we set the °oor to a small number such that it never binds in simulation.


















































The household solves the following optimization problem at time t = 0, given its house
tenure status (D0
¡1), after-labor income wealth (Q0), permanent labor income (P Y
0 ), house
price (P H











F(t) U(Ct;Ht;Nt) + [F(t ¡ 1) ¡ F(t)]B(Qt)
¾
; (12)
subject to the mortgage collateral borrowing constraint (equation 6), the borrowing constraint
on liquid assets (equation 7), wealth processes (equation 8), and the intertemporal budget
constraints (equation 9). The parameter ¯ is the time discount factor.
2.5. Characterization of Individual Housing and Consumption Be-
havior
We simplify the household's optimization problem by exploiting the problem's scale inde-
pendence, and normalize housing and ¯nancial wealth level variables by households' per-
manent income. After normalization, the household's vector of choice variables become
at = fct;ht;st;Do
t;Ds
tg, where ct = Ct
PY





is the house value-permanent income ratio, and st = St
PY
t is the liquid asset-permanent in-
come ratio. We can characterize a household's decision rule by its normalized state variable
xt = fDo
t¡1;qt;ht;P H
t g, where qt =
Qt
PY
t is the household's wealth-permanent labor income




t is the beginning-of-period house value to permanent income ratio.
An analytical solution for our problem does not exist. We thus derive numerical solutions
through value function iterations. Appendix A provides details of our numerical method.
Qualitatively, at a given household age, the e®ects of wealth{income ratio and house value{
income ratio on the household's optimal decision rules are similar to those reported in Yao and
9Zhang (2005). A renter's house tenure decision is largely determined by his wealth-income
ratio. The more wealth a renter has relative to his income, the more likely he will buy as
more wealth on hand enables the renter to a®ord the down payment for a house of desired
value. The wealth-income ratio that triggers homeownership is U-shaped, re°ecting the high
mobility rates of young households and short expected duration of an older household. Once
becoming a homeowner, a household will stay in the house so long as its house value-income
ratio is not too far from the optimal level it would have chosen as a renter, in order to avoid
incurring transaction costs.
A renter's consumption and savings functions are similar to those identi¯ed in the precau-
tionary savings literature with liquidity constraints. At low wealth levels, a renter continues
to rent and spends all his wealth on numeraire good and rent payment. At relatively higher
wealth levels, a renter starts saving for intertemporal consumption smoothing and housing
down payment. For a homeowner who stays in his existing house, the value of his house
also a®ects his nonhousing consumption, re°ecting the e®ect of substitution between the two
goods.
When the utility function takes the form of Cobb-Douglas in our setup as in most macro
studies, the household's choice of homeownership and house value is invariant to house price
changes. In other words, in solving households' problems, we do not need to separate P H
t from
Ht (see Li and Yao 2007). Under the more °exible CES utility, however, things are di®erent.
In particular, when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution parameter ³ is smaller than
one, a household will spend a larger share of his expenditure on housing when the house price
becomes higher. This leads to a higher house value{income ratio for the desired house. The
more expensive house in turn requires a larger down payment, which slows down a household's
transition to homeownership. For homeowners, a higher desired house value{income ratio
results in higher level of adjustment boundaries at higher house prices.
3. Data and Estimation Procedure
We implement a two-stage method of simulated moments (MSM) to estimate our theoretical
model. This methodology was ¯rst introduced by Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Du±e and
Singleton (1993) to estimate structural economic models without closed-form solutions. Since
then, MSM has been successfully applied to estimations of preference parameters in Gourin-
10chas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003), and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2007), labor
supply decisions by French (2005), and medical expenses and the savings of elderly singles by
De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006), among many others.
The mechanics of our MSM approach are standard. In the ¯rst stage, we estimate or
calibrate the parameters that can be cleanly identi¯ed without the explicit use of our model.
In the second stage, we take as given the parameters obtained in the ¯rst stage and estimate
the rest of the model parameters by minimizing the distance between the simulated moments
derived from the optimal household decision pro¯les and those observed in the data. We
provide detailed discussions of ¯rst- and second-stage estimation after describing our data
sources.
3.1. Data Sources
The main data we use in this study are taken from University of Michigan Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal survey that followed a nationally
representative random sample of families and their extensions since 1968. The survey details
economic and demographic information for a sample of households annually from 1968 to
1997 and biannually after 1997. From 1984 through 1999, a wealth supplement to the PSID
surveyed the assets and liabilities of each household at ¯ve-year intervals. The supplemental
survey becomes biennial after 1999, coinciding with the main survey frequency.
For households to be included in our data sample, they have to be present in the 1984
survey but not in the 1968 sub-sample of low income families. Observations were further
deleted for the following reasons:
² The age of the household head is younger than 25 or older than 54 in the 1984 survey.
² The state of residence is missing.
² Households obtained housing as a gift, or live in housing paid by someone outside of the
family unit, or owned by relatives.
² Households live in a a public housing project owned by a local housing authority or
public agency.
² Households neither own nor rent.
² The head of the household is female.
11² The head of the household is a farmer or rancher.
² The head of the household does not have a valid age variable.
² The household head is unmarried in any wave of survey.
² The real household labor income is less than 10,000 or more than 1 million dollars.
² Information on households' net worth, income, or house value for homeowners is missing.
The ¯nal sample consists of 17,396 observations for 1,069 households. We use this sample
to estimate life-cycle income pro¯les and to compute sample moments. We supplement PSID
data with information from American Housing Survey (AHS) and the O±ce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for house price information, and Current Population Survey
(CPS) for mobility and life expectancy information.
3.2. First-Stage Estimation and Calibration
3.2.1. Life-cycle Income Pro¯les
The income in our model corresponds to after-tax non¯nancial income empirically. We cal-
ibrate the stochastic income process (equations (3){(5)) in the following manner. We ¯rst
compute before{tax income as the total reported wages and salaries, social security income,
unemployment compensation, workers compensation, supplemental social security, other wel-
fare, child support, and transfers from relatives from both the head of household and his
spouse.11
We then subtract from the households' pre-tax income de¯ned above federal and state
income tax liabilities as estimated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)'s
TAXSIM program (Feenberg and Coutts 1993), which calculates taxes under the US federal
and state income tax laws from individual data, including marital status, wage and salary of
household head and his or her spouse, and number of dependents.
The after-tax income is further de°ated using a nonshelter consumer price index (CPI-NS)
provided by Bureau of Labor Statistics with year 2004-2005 normalized to 100. We refer to
this de°ated disposable income as household labor income in the paper.
11Recall that we only use married households from the PSID in our sample.
12Finally, we apply an approach similar to the one used in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005) to estimate coe±cients for a sixth-order polynomial function of age and retirement
income replacement ratio, as well as standard deviation for permanent and transitory shocks
to income. We estimate the standard deviation for the permanent income shock, ¾", to be
0.11, and for the transitory income shock, ¾º, to be 0.22. The income replacement ratio after
retirement µ is estimated to be 0.96.12 The technical details are provided in Appendix C.
3.2.2. Mortality, Mobility, and Household Composition
The conditional survival rates (f¸jg
j=T
j=0) are taken from the 1998 life tables of the National
Center for Health Statistics (Anderson 2001). The exogenous moving rates are obtained by
¯tting a ¯fth-order polynomial of age to the CPS households moving across county in year
2005. The life-cycle pro¯le of family equivalent size for all married couples in the PSID is
computed following Scholz et al. (2006). The calibrated life-cycle income, mortality, mobility,
and family size pro¯les are presented in Figure 1.
3.2.3. The House Price Process
When solving for decision rules in our theoretical model, we assume that the rate of appreci-
ation for house price rH
t is serially uncorrelated. We set the mean rate of return to housing to
0 and the standard deviation ¾H to 0.10, similar to estimates in Campbell and Cocco (2003)
and Flavin and Yamashita (2002). We further assume that there is no correlation between
housing returns and shocks to labor income.
The house price demonstrates a strong positive trend over part of the sample period in
1996-2005. To capture this aggregate trend, in simulating the model, we feed in the realized
real housing return based on households' state of residence, supplemented by a random shock.
Appendix D provides details on the construction of state-level house price index over time.
12Our retirement income ratio is a bit higher than typical estimates in the literature since our income
de¯nition is on an after-tax basis.
133.2.4. Other Parameters
Other parameters in the ¯rst stage are largely chosen according to the literature. The decision
frequency is annual. Households enter the economy at age 25 and live to a maximum age of
100, i.e., T = 75. The mandatory retirement age is 65 (J = 40).
The annual real interest rate is set at 2.7 percent, approximately the average annualized
post-WWII real return available on T-bills. The mortgage collateral constraint is set at 80
percent.13 The wealth °oor ´ is picked at a low 0.10 of permanent labor income. This number
is within the range of those used in the literature (for example, De Nardi, French, and Jones
2006) and rarely binds in our simulation. Table 2 summarizes parameters from our ¯rst-stage
calibrations.
3.3. Second-Stage Estimation
In this subsection, we describe our choices of moment conditions and how they help to identify
the structure parameters of our model. One major advantage of structural estimation of a
rich life-cycle model is that it allows us to explicitly address potential biases by replicating
them in the simulation. For example, we account for the endogeneity of homeownership
status, market frictions and incompleteness (for example, borrowing constraints and housing
adjustment costs), by incorporating these features in our theoretical model. To mitigate
potential biases caused by cohort and time e®ects, we group the households in our simulation
by age and calender year, and subject the households to the same house price shocks as in
the data.
3.3.1. Moment Conditions
We estimate the following eight structural parameters in the second stage estimation: ¯ {
subjective time discount factor, ° { curvature measure for the utility function, L { bequest
strength measure, ! { housing expenditure share measure, ³ { elasticity of intratemporal
substitution, Á { house selling costs, Ã { house maintenance costs, and ® { rental rate.14
13Using the 1995 American Housing Survey, Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2007) calculate that
the down payment fraction for ¯rst-time home purchases is 0.1979, while the fraction for households who
previously owned a home is 0.2462.
14For ®, the estimation is performed in terms of rental premium, i.e. ® ¡ r ¡ Ã.
14To identify our structural parameters, we choose to match the average wealth, mobility
rate, homeownership rate, rent{income ratio, and house value{income ratio pro¯les for three
age-cohorts and for each year between 1985 and 2005.15 The three age cohorts are constructed
according to birth year. The ¯rst cohort consists of households whose heads were born between
1950 and 1959; the second cohort consists of households whose heads were born between 1940
and 1949; and the third cohort is made up of households with heads born between 1930 and
1939. Therefore, at the beginning of our sample year 1984, the three cohorts' age ranges are
25{34, 35-44, and 45{54, respectively.
In addition, to exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity in house prices, for each age cohort{
calender year cell, we also match the average homeownership rate, rents, and house value
pro¯le for households residing in the most and least expensive states.16
We thus have at most 11 moments for each age cohort{year cell, for a potential maximum
of 11£21£3 = 693 moments. We lost 45 moments since wealth variables are only available for
years 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. Further, we lost an additional 18 moments
because the rent variable is missing for 1988 and 1989. The number of total matched moments
ends up at 630.17
The cell sizes are 434, 393, and 242 respectively at the start of the sample for the three
birth-year cohorts. These cell sizes declined to 277, 196, and 34 over time as some households
dropped out of the survey over time.18
3.3.2. Construction of Simulated Moments
In the second-stage estimation, we ¯rst choose a vector of structure parameters and solve the
optimal decision rules as described in the previous section, taking the ¯rst-stage parameters
15We drop year 1984 in the moment matching since we initiate our simulation by randomly drawing house-
holds from the 1984 PSID data.
16We de¯ne the most expensive states as the 18 states with the highest house price level in 1995, the middle-
year in our sample, and the least expensive states as the 19 states with the lowest house price level in 1995.
According to this de¯nition, we have roughly equal numbers of households residing in the most expensive, least
expensive, and medium price range states in 1984. The choice of 1995 is inconsequential since the ranking of
house prices hardly changed during our sample period.
17We defer description about sample households' housing and wealth pro¯le to the next section, where we
discuss them in comparison to predictions from our model.
18We did not drop cell with a small size. In our weighting matrix, the cells with small sample counts have
very low weights in the distance measure.
15as given. We then simulate households' behavior to construct our simulated moments under
the given choice of parameters.
To initialize our simulation, we randomly draw 1,000 households from each age group
between 25 and 54 in the 1984 PSID data, for an initial simulated sample of 30,000 households.
We then assign a series of moving, income, and house price shocks to each simulated path.19
We update the simulated sample path each time period based on the optimal decision rules.
Once all simulated paths are complete, we compute the average pro¯les for our target
variables in the same way that we compute them from the real data, i.e., by grouping house-
holds into di®erent calender year £ age cohort £ house price level cells. Finally we construct a
model ¯tness measure by weighting the di®erences between the average pro¯le in the simulated
model economy and the data with a weight matrix.20
The procedure is repeated until the weighted di®erence between the data and simulated
pro¯les is minimized.21 Appendix B provides more details on our MSM estimation technique.
4. Results
4.1. Housing and Wealth Pro¯les over Time and over the Life Cycle
Figures 3 to 10 show the ¯t of our baseline model to the empirical data pro¯les. The green
solid line with solid dots depicts the empirical data pro¯le, while the red dashed line marked
with crosses represents the average pro¯le from our model.
19While moving and income shocks come from computer random number generators governed by their
respective stochastic process, the house price path comes from the actual realized house price in the household's
state of residence in order to capture the aggregate trend in house price in the sample. By doing so, we allowed
the ex post sample average house price appreciations over the short time period, which is used in simulation,
to deviate signi¯cantly from the ex ante assumption of zero mean house price appreciation, which is used in
the solution of optimal decision rules.
20The theoretically most e±cient weighting matrix is the inverse of sample variance-covariance matrix. We
use a diagonal matrix for weighting given our small sample size. Our weighting matrix takes the diagonal
terms of the optimal weighting matrix for scaling purpose, while setting the o®-diagonal term to be zero. A
similar approach is adopted in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006). According to Altonji and Segal (1996),
the optimal weighting matrix, though asymptotically e±cient, can be severely biased in small samples.
21The minimization of weighted moment distance is achieved through a combination of a global population-
based optimization using a di®erential evolution method and a local nongradient-based search routine via a
simplex algorithm.
16Households become richer as they age for all cohorts. At the same time, older cohorts are
also richer than younger cohorts. The youngest cohort accumulates wealth for the ¯rst 10
years in the sample, a behavior consistent with the existence of the borrowing constraint and
a precautionary savings motive.
Overall, the homeownership rate starts at around 70 percent for the youngest cohort, and
quickly goes up to 90 percent in 10 years.22 The other two older cohorts also demonstrate
slight increases in homeownership rates over the sample period. By the end of the sample
period, most households have achieved homeownership.
As expected, the homeownership rate of the youngest cohorts in the most expensive states
is much lower than those in the least expensive states. For all three cohorts, the average house
value{income ratios for those in the most expensive states are much higher than those in the
least expensive states. The ratios also grow much faster over the sample period. While renters
in the most expensive states on average also spend a larger share of their income in housing
services, the time trend is less clear since we have few renters in the sample, especially for the
later years.
The moving rates are low in the sample, and are over 10 percent only for the youngest
group in the earlier part of the sample. The rates decrease slightly over time as households
settle down, and are in the single digits over most of the sample years for the two older cohorts.
The lack of moving points to large ¯xed costs associated with changing one's residence.
Overall, our model captures the trend in data pro¯les reasonably well. We miss along
some dimensions, though. The model generates lower wealth accumulation and higher rent
expenditure than the data for the most senior cohorts. We have relatively fewer households in
the old cohort in the data, especially renters. We suspect that the ill-match is largely caused by
data idiosyncracies. Additionally, we abstract from other considerations such as participating
in stock market that potentially plays a bigger role in the savings of older households.
22The overall homeownership rate in our sample is much higher than the country as a whole. This is due
to our sample selection criterion in order to maintain household stability. Recall that we only admit married
couple with income above $10,000 to our sample.
174.2. Parameter Estimates and Identi¯cation
According to our estimation, the annual discount factor ¯ is 0.96, and the risk aversion
parameter is 6.19, both within the range viewed as plausible by most economists. The bequest
strength L is estimated to be 1.00. While the time discount factor and risk aversion are largely
determined by the wealth accumulation earlier in life, the bequest strength is mostly driven
by households' wealth pro¯les later in life.
As for the intratemporal utility function, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution be-
tween housing and nonhousing consumption is estimated to be 0.33, while the share parameter
! is estimated to be 2:56 £ 10 ¡ e4. These two parameters are largely identi¯ed through the
cross-sectional as well as time series variation of house value{income ratio and home owner-
ship rates. Households in expensive states spend more relative to their income on housing,
both when renting and when owning. The higher house value{income ratio requires a larger
down payment, which takes longer to accumulate and delays transition to homeownership. To
illustrate the implications of our estimated ! and ³ parameters on the cross-sectional house
expenditure patterns, we compute the implied renters' housing expenditure shares for all 50
states based on the house price in year 2005, and present it in Figure 2. The share varies from
13.1 percent for the cheapest state (Kansas) at $46.2 per square foot, to 42.8 percent in the
most expensive state (Washington, D.C.) at $493.6 per square foot.
Our point estimate of intratemporal elasticity of substitution implies that housing and
nonhousing consumption are complements, and is much smaller than the macro estimates.
The di®erence between our estimate and the macro estimates results largely from the fact
that the macro literature has examined the aggregate consumption data in time series absent
of adjustment cost using Euler Equation estimations.23
Our estimate is closer to some of the micro estimates. Hanushek and Quigley (1980) look
at data from the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment, which involved a sample of low-
income renters in Pittsburgh and Phoenix. Households in each city were randomly assigned
to treatment groups which received rent subsidies that varied from 20 percent to 60 percent
and a control group that received no subsidy. The estimated price elasticities were 0.64 for
23For example, Siegel (2005) shows in his work that there exists substantial deviation of implications of this
methodology from the frictionless economy, consistent with the presence of nonconvex adjustment costs for
housing. He also shows how empirical asset pricing tests that use aggregate data can be a®ected by these
deviations.
18Pittsburgh and 0.45 for Phoenix. Siegel (2005) estimates the elasticity from the PSID over the
period 1978-1997. Aggregating across households and using only the time series information,
Siegel estimated elasticity of substitution to be 0.53.24 Flavin and Nagazawa (2008), by
contrast, use PSID over the period 1975 to 1985. Instead of using households' self-reported
house value, they construct a housing service measure and derive Euler Equation conditions on
consumption for households that do not move. Their estimate of the elasticity of substitution
between housing and nonhousing consumption is a very low 0.13.25
The house selling cost parameter Á is estimated to be 15 percent of the house value. This
number is identi¯ed by the (low) level of the mobility rate observed in the data. While this
number looks large relative to the typical 5-6 percent commission charged by a realtor for
selling a house, the cost measure also takes into account search costs, moving costs, mortgage
closing costs, as well as possible psychological costs.26 In addition, since our sample covers
only married couples, we expect the moving cost to be higher than an average household.
The house maintenance cost is estimated to be 2.26 percent of the house value, which
implies that the user cost of homeownership is Ã + rf ¡ ¹h = 4:96 percent. While the
cross-section variation of the house value{income ratio helps to pin down the intratemporal
preference parameters, the average level of the same ratio identi¯es the house maintenance
parameter.
Renting is estimated to incur an extra cost close to 1.85 percent of the property value.
The spread is identi¯ed through homeownership pro¯les and rent{income ratio. The implied
® parameter, which is the sum of the cost of capital, maintenance, depreciation, and rental
24Siegel (2005) limits the sample to only homeowners, and uses total household food expenditure as a proxy
for nondurable consumption, and uses the self-reported value of the owner-occupied house for housing, and
assuming durable consumption is constant until the household moves.
25By focusing on nonmovers, Flavin and Nagazawa (2008) GMM methodology is robust to the existence of
adjustment cost. However, their empirical estimates, which are based on consumption Euler Equations, could
be sensitive to assumptions about borrowing constraints and other market incompleteness.
26Closing fees generally include: 1) loan origination fee; 2) loan application fee; 3) title search; 4) title insur-
ance; 5) inspection fee; 6) appraisal fee, 7) credit report fee; 8) attorney / settlement fee; and 9) government
recording and transfer charges. Unlike realtors' fees, these fees vary substantially from state to state and
often depend on the amount of the loan, the amount of the down payment, and the creditworthiness of the
borrower. Woodward (2003) estimates total closing costs to be $4;050 on a house with a value of $162;500, or
2.5 percent of the house value. Regarding the search and psychic cost of moving, using the Housing Allowance
Demand Experiment, Bartik, Butler, and Liu (1992) found that the average household was willing to pay 10 to
17 percent of their current income to stay in their current residence rather than move. If we use the industry
lending standard that house value is about 4 times annual income, this cost amounts to 2.5 to 4.3 percent of
house value. Adding together the estimated realtors' fee, closing cost, and psychic cost of moving, we obtain
a number that is over 10 percent of house value to be associated with selling a house.
19premium, is at 6.81 percent. Our estimation of rental costs is within the range, albeit at the
lower end, of the user cost for homeownership as calculated by Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai
(2005) for 46 metro areas.
5. Policy Analysis
Using our estimated model, we now conduct policy experiments. The goal is to investigate
how households respond to changes in house prices in conjunction with changes in income
and/or credit market conditions in the mortgage market.
We ¯rst draw the initial population from the 2005 PSID data, and then simulate it forward
using the optimal decision rules. Between year 2005 and 2007, shocks to house price and
income follow their realized counterparts at the state and national levels, respectively.27 From
2008 to 2011, we simulate our economy according to di®erent assumptions on income and
house price as summarized in Table 4. In particular, we employ two choices about income
growth rates: 0 percent through all 4 years or as forecasted by Macroeconomic Advisers (MA).
We have three assumptions on house price growth rates: 0 through all 4 years, as forecasted
by Macroeconomic Advisers (MA), or as forecasted by Case-Shiller Futures Market from the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Note that MA does not provide forecasts beyond 2010, we thus
set the growth rates in income or house price to 0 for that year when we use MA forecasts.
Finally, we have two assumptions on borrowing conditions: a 80 percent mortgage loan-to-
value ratio versus a 70 percent mortgage loan-to-value ratio. In all experiments, we focus on
aggregate home ownership rate, average house value for homeowners, and average non-housing
consumption for all households.28
Table 5 provides our benchmark simulation results where we set the growth rates on income
and housing to zero throughout the forecast horizon. Note that there is a slight decline in
the home ownership rate and house value for homeowners. This is because, by setting the
27We supplement these aggregate shocks with idiosyncratic shocks from the computer random number
generator governed by their respective stochastic process.
28The reported aggregate statistics is based on a sample constant in age distribution. We achieve so by
admitting one new young age group into the sample each year while dropping the oldest households from the
sample. The aggregate statistics is then computed using population weight for each age group from from the
2000 Census. Speci¯cally, we only include households between the age 30 and 80 for the calculation. In other
words, a household that is 29 in 2005 will not appear in the calculation of the aggregate statistics in 2005, but
will enter the 2006 calculation as the household turns 30. Similarly, a household who is 80 in 2005 will appear
in the 2005 sample but will drop out of the 2006 sample.
20growth rates in housing and income to zero, we are essentially putting an end to the long
boom the economy experienced prior to 2007. Non-housing consumption generally declines
over the forecast horizon as well.
We then conduct three sets of experiments. In the ¯rst set as reported in Table 6, we
set income growth rates to zero, but let house prices vary according to three di®erent paths:
zero for all the four years as in \Basecase", MA housing forecasts as in \MA", and CS
housing forecasts as in \CS". Relative to the \Basecase", under the MA house price forecasts
(\MA"), home ownership rates drop much more especially during the ¯rst three years when
house prices decline. This is because, as home prices drop, existing homeowners need to put
down additional equity in order to maintain the required mortgage loan-to-value ratio. Those
who are unable to do so are forced to sell their homes. In addition, existing homeowners who
receive the moving shock may not be able to purchase another house of desired value since
their equity has eroded. Of course, the lower house price will encourage renters to become
homeowners. But this e®ect is dominated by the negative e®ects of house price declines on
home ownership rate. Average home values for homeowners decline much more largely due
to the direct e®ect of a lower house price on house value. Non-housing consumption also falls
through all four years as homeowners have fewer resources to maintain their previous non-
housing consumption level either because they have to put in additional equity into the house
to meet the required mortgage loan-to-value ratio or because they take costs when selling their
houses. The declines in average home ownership rates, average house value for homeowners,
and average non-housing consumption are much more pronounced in \CS". In particular, by
year 2011, after a nearly 35 percent cumulative decline in house prices, compared to 2007,
home ownership falls by 4.6 percent, three times of the drop in \MA", average house value
falls by 28 percent, which doubles the fall in \MA", and non-housing consumption falls by
over 3 percent, over 2 times of the drop in \MA".
In the second set of experiments, we let income growth rates follow the MA forecasts,
and let house price growth rates be °at as in \Basecase", MA forecasts as in \MA", or CS
forecasts as in \CS." We report the results in Table 6. Two observations emerge. First, for
given income growth rates, it remains that the more severe house price declines are, the more
serious the declines in home ownership rates, average house value for homeowners, and average
non-housing consumption are. Second, compared with the ¯rst set of experiments, house price
declines, when coupled with income declines, have much more signi¯cant detrimental e®ects
21on home ownership rates, house value, and non-housing consumption. This second result
stems from the fact that as income drops, many households ¯nd it unable to maintain their
mortgage loan-to-value ratio and/or their house maintenance cost. Homeowners, thus, may
exit home ownership in order to obtain liquidity to maintain their non-housing consumption.
As income starts to recover in 2009, the declines in all three economic variables of interest
become much more muted.
In the third set of experiments, we repeat the second set of experiments except that we let
the required mortgage-loan-to-value ratio to decline to 70 percent. The results are reported in
Table 7. As can be seen, it remains that severe house prices drops lead to signi¯cant declines
in average home ownership rates, house value for homeowners, and non-housing consumption.
Interestingly, compared to the second set of experiments, tighter borrowing constraints, espe-
cially when coupled with declines in house prices, lead to signi¯cant drops in home ownership
rates as households ¯nd it harder to borrow in order to purchase a house. It actually ame-
liorates the declines in average house value for existing homeowners and average non-housing
consumption. In other words, when it is harder to access the mortgage market, house price
declines have less of an e®ect on consumption. This result re°ects largely the selection e®ect
associated with a tighter borrowing constraint. Put it simply, tighter borrowing constraints
lead to relatively wealthy households becoming homeowners as these households can a®ord the
required mortgage loan-to-value ratios and these households are much better at weathering
house price declines.
Finally, we calculate the marginal propensity to consume, a popular measurement of the
e®ects of house price changes on consumption, by dividing the non-housing consumption
di®erences by the di®erences in house value for homeowners after the realization of the new
house price shock before the adjustment of consumption allocations. We ¯nd that non-housing
consumption responds nonlinearly to changes in house prices with average marginal propensity
to consume out of changes in housing wealth ranging from 0.4 percent to 6 percent.
6. Conclusions and Future Extensions
In this paper, we provide a structural estimation of a dynamic model of household consumption
over the life cycle augmented with housing. We explicitly model housing adjustment along
both the extensive margin of owning versus renting and the intensive margin of house size.
22The model also includes a credit constraint in the form of collateral mortgage borrowing. The
paper, thus, contributes to the analysis and understanding of household housing demand and
the impact of housing market on household consumption, housing as well as nonhousing.
Our estimation indicates that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing
and nonhousing consumption is about 0.33 and the housing adjustment cost for married
stable households amounts to 15 percent of the house value. Policy experiments using the
estimated model further reveal that households respond nonlinearly to house price changes,
with large house price declines leading to sizable drops in total homeownership rate as well as
nonhousing consumption. Interestingly, in an environment with tightened lending condition,
while households homeownership decision becomes more sensitive to house price changes, their
nonhousing consumption is less a®ected.
There are many natural extensions to our model. One is to allow for richer household
portfolio decisions by di®erentiating further between stocks and bonds in a household's liquid
asset menu. Another is to model mortgage contracts more explicitly and realistically by
imposing mortgage amortization requirements as well as re¯nancing charges.
23Appendix A: Model Simpli¯cations and Numerical Solutions
Given the recursive nature of the problem, we can rewrite the intertemporal consumption and
investment problem as follows:
Vt(Xt) = max
At
f¸t [U(Ct;Ht;Nt) + ¯Et[Vt+1(Xt+1)]] + (1 ¡ ¸t)B(Qt)g; (13)
where Xt = fDo
t¡1;Qt;P Y
t ;P H
t ;Ht¡1g is the vector of endogenous state variables, and At =
fCt;Ht;St;Do
t;Ds
tg is the vector of choice variables.
We simplify the household's optimization problem by exploiting the scale-independence
of the problem and normalize the household's continuous state and choice variables by its
permanent income P Y
t . The vector of endogenous state variables is transformed to xt =
fDo
t¡1;qt;ht;P H
t g, where qt =
Qt
PY





t is the beginning-of-period house value to permanent income ratio. Let ct = Ct
PY
t




t be the house value-permanent income
ratio, and st = St
PY
t be the liquid asset-permanent income ratio. The evolution of normalized
endogenous state variables is then governed by:
qt+1 =
st(1 + r) + Do
tht[(1 + ~ rH
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The household's budget constraint can then be written as

































t )1¡° to be the normalized value function, then the recursive optimization
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ct > 0; ht > 0; st ¸ 0; lt · 1 ¡ ±;
and equations (15) to (17), where at = fct;ht;st;Do
t;Ds
tg is the normalized vector of choice
variables. Hence the normalization reduces the number of continuous state variables to three
with P Y
t no longer serving as a state variable.
We discretize the wealth{labor-income ratio (qt) into 160 grids equally-spaced in the log-
arithm of the ratio, the house value-labor income ratio (ht) into equally-spaced grids of 80,
and the house price (P H
t ) into 80 grids equally-spaced in the logarithm of the price. The
boundaries for the grids are chosen to be wide enough so that our simulated time series path
always falls within the de¯ned state space.
Under the assumption that only liquidated wealth will be passed along to bene¯ciaries, the
household's house tenure status and housing positions do not enter the bequest function. At
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The value function at date T is then used to solve for the optimal decision rules for all
admissible points on the state space at date T ¡ 1.
For a household coming into period t as a renter (Dt¡1 = 0), we perform two separate
optimizations conditional on house tenure choices { renting or owning { for the current period.
A renter's optimal house tenure choice for the current period is then determined by comparing
25the contingent value functions of renting and owning. To calculate the expected next period's
value function, we use two discrete states to approximate the realizations of each of the three
continuous exogenous state variables (ln";lnº, and ~ rH
t ) by Gaussian quadrature (Tauchen and
Hussey 1991). Together with two states for the realizations of moving shocks, the procedure
results in sixteen discrete exogenous states for numerical integration. For points that lie
between grid points in the state space, depending on the household's current period house
tenure choice, we use either a two-dimension or a three-dimension cubic spline interpolation
to approximate the value function.
For a household coming into period t as a homeowner, we perform an optimization con-
ditional on staying in the existing house for the current period. In this case, the household
cannot adjust its house value-income ratio, i.e., ht = ht, but can adjust its numeraire con-
sumption. The value function contingent on moving { either endogenously or exogenously {
is the same as the value function of a renter who is endowed with the same wealth-income
ratio (qt) and house price (P H
t ). We compare the value functions contingent on moving and
staying to determine the optimal house liquidation decision. Under our assumption and pa-
rameterization, a homeowner always has a positive amount of equity in his house after home
sales and thus has no incentive to default. A homeowner who cannot satisfy the mortgage
collateral constraint or a®ord the house maintenance cost has to sell his home. This procedure
is repeated recursively for each period until the solution for date t = 0 is found.
26Appendix B: Estimation Mechanics in the MSM Estimator
We assume that the \true" parameter vector µ¤ = f¯;°;L;!;³;Á;Ã;®g lies in the interior
of the compact set £ ½ R8. Our estimator, ^ µ, is the value of µ that minimizes the weighted
distance between the estimated life-cycle pro¯les for wealth, mobility rate, homeownership
rate, house value, and rent observed from the data and the simulated pro¯les generated by
the model. We choose to match these ¯ve variables, which we interact with age cohort (T = 3)
and calendar year (C = 3). Additional interactions are used for the last three house-related
variables, which we further interact with three house price levels in the state where a household
resided. This interaction results in six additional moments. The moment count per year and
cohort is therefore equal to 11(5 + 6). The overall count of moments is 11 £ C £ T = 33T.
We combine all these moment conditions by stacking them and solving the optimal problems
jointly.
Given a data set of Ic independent individuals within a given age cohort c who are observed
repeatedly for T periods, let ±(µ) denote a vector of moment conditions with 11T elements,








0c WIc^ ±Ic(µ); (19)
where c W is a 11T £ 11T weighting matrix, and ¿c is the ratio of the number of observations
in data for cohort c to the number of simulated observations. If the regularity conditions
presented in Pakes and Pollard (1989) are met, our MSM estimator ^ µ is both consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed:
p
I(^ µ ¡ µ
¤) Ã N(0;V );
with the variance-covariance matrix V given by










27which is the 33T £11 Jacobian matrix of the population moment vector; and W = plim!1 Ã
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33T¡11;
where Q¡1 is the generalized inverse of
Q = PSP




Analogous to the optimal weighting matrix in a GMM model, the e±ciency of our SMM esti-
mator improves as c WI converges to S¡1, which is the inverse of the sample variance-covariance
matrix. If W = S¡1, then V is reduced to (1 + ¿)(D0S¡1D)¡1, and Q is equivalent to S. Ac-
cording to Altonji and Segal (1996), the optimal weighting matrix, though asymptotically
e±cient, can be severely biased in small samples. We use a diagonal matrix for weighting
given our small sample size. Our weighting matrix takes the diagonal terms of the optimal
weighting matrix for scaling, while setting the o®-diagonal term to be zero. A similar approach
is adopted in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006).
28Appendix C: Constructing Labor Income Process
Using PSID households from 1984 to 2005, we eliminate the Survey of Economic Opportunities
subsample and households live in public housing projects owned by a local housing authority
or public agency. We further exclude households that neither own nor rent or whose head
is female, a farmer, or a rancher. We use only households whose heads are married and are
between 20 and 70 years of age. As described in Section 4, the federal and state income
tax liabilities are obtained from the TAXSIM simulation program. We regress the logarithm
of after-tax household labor income on dummy variables for age, education, and household
composition, using a household ¯xed e®ect model. A ¯fth-order polynomial is used to ¯t
the age dummies in order to obtain the labor income pro¯le, which is presented in Figure
1. Furthermore, the replacement ratio µ in equation (5), which determines the amount of
retirement income, was approximated as the ratio of the average of our labor income variable
de¯ned above for retiree-headed households to the average of labor income in the last working
year.
Following the variance decomposition procedure described by Carroll and Samwick (1997),
we ¯rst de¯ne a d-year income di®erence as follows:
rd = [log(Yt+d) ¡ log(P
Y




V ar(rd) = d ¤ ¾
2
" + 2 ¤ ¾
2
º:
We then regress V ar(rd)'s calculated from the data on d's to obtain estimates on ¾2
" and ¾2
º.
We choose d to be 1,2,...,22.
29Appendix D: Constructing House Price Series at State Level
Our state-level house price index (HPI) comes from the O±ce of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO). The HPI is a time series price index that is set to 100 for every state
for the base year 1980. This price index is thus not comparable cross-sectionally. To create a
state-level price index series that is also cross-sectionally comparable, we utilize the housing
price information from the PSID. In particular, we de¯ne house prices as prices per square
foot of living space. Unfortunately, PSID does not provide information on living space and
we have to impute the square footage of homes for our data. Following Flavin and Nakagawa
(2008), we ¯rst use data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) (1985-2005) to estimate a
model of square footage as a function of the number of rooms and other housing characteristics
common to both the AHS and the PSID, such as dummy variables representing whether the
household was (1) located in a suburb, (2) located in a non-SMA region, (3) living in a mobile
home, and a third order polynomial in the number of rooms. Separate models were estimated
for each of the four regions (Northeast, Mideast, South, and West. The regional models
estimated from the AHS data, reported in Table 1, were then used to generate estimated
square footage data for each PSID household. Using these estimates, we predict house sizes
for all homeowners in our PSID sample. The nominal house prices per square foot are then
obtained by dividing the house value reported from the PSID by the predicted house size.
The nominal house prices for individual households are then collapsed by state and year to
obtain average house prices. For each state, we can use the imputed nominal price in any
year, along with the HPI from OFHEO to calculate the nominal house price for a benchmark
year, 1993, which is the midpoint of the time frame of our data. Given the fact that OFHEO
and PSID surveyed di®erent random sample of American households, we anticipate that the
nominal prices for 1993 converted from di®erent years might vary. We therefore choose to use
the median of these converted values. Once the median nominal price is determined for each
state in the benchmark year, we can scale the HPI from OFHEO so that the new HPI for





Altonji, Joseph G., and Lewis M. Segal, 1996, Small-Sample Bias in GMM Estimation of
Covariance Structures, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 14(3), 353-366.
Anderson, Robert N., 2001, United State Life Tables 1998, National Vital Statistics Reports
48, 1-40.
Attanasio, O., 2000, Consumer Durables and Inertial Behaviour: Estimation and Aggregation
of (S, s) Rules for Automobile Purchases, Review of Economic Studies, 67, 667-696.
Bajari, Patrick, Phoebe Chan, Dirk Kruger, and Dan Miller, 2008, A Dynamic Model of
Housing Demand: Estimation and Policy Implications, Working Paper, University of
Pennsylvania.
Bartik, Timothy J., J.S. Butler, and J.T. Liu, 1992, Maximum Score Estimates of the Deter-
minants of Residential Mobility: Implications for the Value of Residential Attachment
and Neighborhood Amenities, Journal of Urban Economics, 32, 233256.
Caballero, Ricardo J., 1993, Durable Goods: An Explanation for Their Slow Adjustment,
Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), 351-384.
Cagetti, Marco, 2003, Wealth Accumulation Over the Life Cycle and Precautionary Savings,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21(3), 339-353.
Campbell, John, and Joao F. Cocco, 2007, How Do House Prices A®ect Consumption? Evi-
dence from Micro Data, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3), 591-621.
Campbell, John,and Joao F. Cocco, 2003, Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage
Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1449-1494.
Carroll, Christopher D. and Wendy E. Dunn, 1997, Unemployment Expectations, Jumping
(S,s) Triggers, and Household Balance Sheets, in Benjamin S. Bernanke and Julio J.
Rotemberg, editors, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 165-229. MIT Press: Cambridge,
MA.
Carroll, Christopher D., and Andrew A. Samwick, 1997, The Nature of Precautionary Wealth,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 40(1), 41-71.
Case, Karl E., John M. Quigley, and Robert T. Shiller, 2003, Comparing Wealth E®ects:
The Stock Market versus the Housing Market, working paper, University of California,
Berkeley.
31Chambers, Mattew, Carlos Garriga, and Don Schlagenhauf, 2007, Accounting for Changes in
the Homeownership Rate, International Economic Review, forthcoming.
Cocco, Joao F., 2005, Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Housing, Review of Financial Studies,
18, 535-567.
Cocco, Joao F., Francisco J. Gomes, and Pascal J. Maenhout, 2005, Consumption and Port-
folio Choice over the Life-Cycle, Review of Financial Studies 18, 491-533.
Cooper, Russell, John Haltiwanger, and Jonathan L. Willis, 2007, Euler-Equation Estimation
for Discrete Choice Models: A Capital Accumulation Application, Working Paper, Yale
University.
Davis, Morris, and Robert F. Martin, 2008, Housing, Home Production, and the Equity and
Value Premium Puzzles, International Finance Discussion Papers 931, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
De Nardi, Mariacristina, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones, 2006, Di®erential Mortality,
Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles, Working Paper, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Du±e Darrell, and Kenneth J. Singleton, 1993, Simulated Moments Estimation of Markov
Models of Asset Prices, Econometrica, 61(4), 929-952.
Eberly, Janice. C., 1994, Adjustment of Consumers' Durables Stocks: Evidence from Auto-
mobile Purchases, Journal of Political Economy 102, 403-436.
Feenberg, D., and E. Coutts, 1993, An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model, Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 12(1), 189-194.
Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, and Dirk Krueger, 2005, Consumption and Saving over the Life
Cycle: How Important are Consumer Durables?, Working Paper, University of Pennsyl-
vania.
Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, and Dirk Krueger, 2007, Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts
from Consumer Expenditure Survey Data, Review of Economics and Statistics 89(3),
552-565.
Flavin, Marjorie, and Takashi Yamashita, 2002, Owner-Occupied Housing and the Compo-
sition of the Household Portfolio over the Life Cycle, American Economic Review 92,
345-362.
32Flavin, Marjorie, and Shinobu Nakagawa, 2008, A Model of Housing in the Presence of Ad-
justment Costs: A Structural Interpretation of Habit Persistence, American Economic
Review 98(1), 474-495.
French, Eric, 2005, The E®ects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labor Supply and Retirement
Behavior, Review of Economic Studies, 72(2), 395-427.
Gervais, Martin, 2002, Huosing Taxation and Capital Accumulation, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49(7), 1461-1489.
Gomes, Francisco, and Alexander Michaelides, 2005, Optimal Life-Cycle Asset Allocation:
Understanding the Empirical Evidence, Journal of Finance 60(2), 869-904.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan A. Parker, 2002, Consumption over the Life Cycle,
Econometrica, 70, 47-89.
Grossman, Sandford J., and Guy Laroque, 1990, Asset Pricing and Optimal Portfolio Choice
in the Presence of Illiquid Durable Consumption Goods, Econometrica 58, 25-51.
Hanushek, Eric A., and John M. Quigley, 1980, What is the Price Elasticity of Housing
Demand? Review of Economics and Statistics, 62(3), 449-454.
Himmelberg, Charles, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai, Assessing High House Prices: Bub-
bles, Fundamentals and Misperceptions, Journal of Economic Perspective, 19(4), 67 92.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, J. Skinner, and S. Zeldes, 1995, Precautionary Saving and Social Insur-
ance, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 360-399.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, J. Skinner, and S. Zeldes, 1994, Expanding the Life-Cycle Model: Pre-
cautionary Saving and Public Policy, American Economic Review, 84, 174-179.
Iacoviello, Matteo, 2005, House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary Policy in the
Business Cycle, American Economic Review, 95(3), 739-764.
Kahn, James, 2008, Housing Prices, Productivity Growth, and Learning, Manuscript.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, Alexander Michaelides, and Kalin Nikolov, 2007, Winners and Losers in
Housing Markets, manuscript, Princeton University.
Laibson, David, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman, 2007, Estimating Discount Functions
with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle, NBER Working Paper No. 13314.
Li, Wenli, and Rui Yao, 2007, The Life-Cycle E®ects of House Price Changes, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 39(6), 1375-1409.
33Lustig, Hanno, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005, Housing Collateral, Consumption Insur-
ance and Risk Premia: An Empirical Perspective, Journal of Finance 60(3), 1167-1219.
Newey, Whitney K., 1985, Maximum Likelihood Speci¯cation Testing and Conditional Mo-
ment Tests, Econometrica 53(5), 1047-1070.
Ortalo-Magn¶ e, Franc» ois, and Sven Rady, 2005, Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribu-
tion of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints, Review of Economic Studies 73, 459-485.
Pakes, Ariel, and David Pollard, 1989, Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Es-
timators, Econometrica, 57(5), 1027-1057.
Piazzesi, Monica, Martin Schneider, and Selale Tuzel, 2007, Housing, Consumption, and Asset
Pricing, Journal of Financial Economics 83(3), 531-569 (2007).
Scholz, John Karl, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun, 2006, Are Americans Saving
\Optimally" for Retirement? Journal of Political Economy 114(4), 607-643.
Siegel, Stephan, 2005, Consumption-based Asset Pricing: Durable Goods, Adjustment Costs,
and Aggregation, Working Paper, University of Washington.
Stokey, Nancy L., 2007, Adjustment Costs and Consumption Behavior, Manuscript, University
of Chicago.
Tauchen, George, and Robert Hussey, 1991, Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Ap-
proximate Solutions to Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models, Econometrica, 59(2), 371-396.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003, Consumer Expenditures in 2001,
Report 966.
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, 2004, Geographic Mobility: March 2001 to March
2002.
U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, 1991, 1992 Resi-
dential Finance Survey.
Woodward, Susan E., Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market, Sand Hill Econometrics
Research Paper.
Yao, Rui, and Harold H. Zhang, 2005, Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choices with Risky
Labor Income and Borrowing Constraints, Review of Financial Studies, 18, 197{239.
34Table 1
Relationship Between House Size and Housing Characteristics
(Dependent variable: House size in square feet)
Independent Variables Northeast Midwest South West
Constant -69.40 89.45 456.46 221.22
(51.47) (45.40) (34.71) (32.85)
Urban -75.44 -94.50 -91.32 -113.10
(11.55) (8.05) (5.70) (8.47)
MSA 27.62 67.48 41.41 9.76
(14.07) (8.09) (5.84) (8.88)
Mobile home -492.63 -467.63 -299.46 -236.33
(25.44) (15.46) (8.87) (12.53)
# rooms 282.68 204.28 -40.10 107.60
(21.92) (19.98) (15.01) 13.86)
(# rooms)2 20.88 27.39 55.90 34.55
(3.12) (2.87) (2.12) (1.97)
(# rooms)3 -1.55 -1.71 -2.50 -1.70
(0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.86)
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.33
Number of observations 77,126 108,727 159,671 94,800
Notes: Data is from 1987 to 2005 biannual American Housing Survey. Robust standard





Maximum life-cycle period T 75
Mandatory retirement period J 40
Labor Income and House Price Processes
Standard deviation of permanent income shock ¾À 0.10
Standard deviation of temporary income shock ¾" 0.22
Income replacement ratio after retirement µ 0.96
Standard deviation of housing return ¾H 0.100
Liquid Savings
Risk-free interest rate r 0.027
Housing and Mortgage
Down payment requirement ± 0.200
36Table 3
Estimated Structural Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Std Err
Discount rate ¯ 0.961 3.203e-03
Curvature parameter ° 6.186 0.177
Bequest strength L 1.001 0.441
Housing service share ! 2.557e-04 1.422e-04
Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution ³ 0.323 0.0134
Housing selling cost Á 0.149 2.273e-03
Housing maintenance cost Ã 0.026 1.083e-03
Rental premium 0.018 0.596e-03
37Table 4
Policy Analysis: Assumptions
Year MA { income MA { house price CS { house price
(year/year, %) (year/year, %) (year/year, %)
2008 -2.66 -8.00 -14.90
2009 0.55 -2.75 -13.00
2010 1.25 -2.00 -4.60
2011 0.00 0.00 -2.20
Note. We set the 2011 MA (Macroeconomic Advisers) forecast for real per capita disposable income
growth and real house price growth to 0 as MA does not forecast beyond 2011. CS (Case-Shiller)
does not provide income forecast. Their real house price growth rates forecast are calculated from
the futures market from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
38Table 5
Policy Analysis: The Benchmark Simulation
Year Homeownship rate Average house value Non-housing consumption
(%) (2004$) (2004$)
2007 91.58 365,552 62,455
2008 91.30 357,241 62,527
2009 91.28 355,546 62,441
2010 90.88 348,916 62,038
2011 90.75 347,424 61,768
Note. In the benchmark simulation, we let the mean growth rate of house price changes be °at and
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Figure 10. Homeowners' mobility by cohorts in all states
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